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A consideration of the issues, legal and moral,
vis-a-vis the practical applications of quarter and
the duty of a belligerent to capture and/or accept
the surrender of his enemy.
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"They passed two deed cows, torn open by shells,
lying feet ud In the corner of a field. . . . There were
dead Germans and dead Americans strewn at random In the
careless exposure of death, and it was impossible to tell
from the manner In which they lay or the direction of
their weapons what the lines had been or how the battle
had gone. ... In one field, in an almost mathematically
soaced line, there were the bodies of five Americans whose
oarachutes had never opened. They had hit so hard they
had driven into the ground, and their straps had burst
and their equipment lay scattered around them as though
ready for a kind of drunken inspection in a foreign army. • • .
"Twenty meters on the other side of the hedge there
were two oaratroopers out in the ooen, working to free
another American who had been caught in a tree, and was
hanging there, helplessly, swaying six feet from the
ground. Christian fired two short bursts and the two men
on the ground fell Immediately. One of them moved and
started to set up on one elbow. Christian fired again and
the man fell over on his back and lay still.
1. Prom the novel THE YOUNG LIONS by Irwin Shaw.
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"The man in the tree yanked furiously at his cords,
but he could not break free. . • . Christian grinned ud





on you, Bud,' said the paratrooper, he had
a tough, athlete's face, with a broken nose and cold, tough
eyes. But he stopped struggling with the traces and just
hung there, staring at Christian. 'I'll tell you what,
Kraut-face,' the American said, 'you cut me down and I'll
accept your surrender.*
"Christian smiled at him. If only I had a few like
him with me today. . . /then/, . . He shot the paratrooper.
"Christian patted the dead man's leg, with a gesture
which he himself did not understand, part pity, part ad-
miration, oart mockery. • • . Ah, Christian thought, if
they are all like that, we are not going to do very well
2
against them."
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I. INT^Qj' : C"ION
At no time In history has war and all of its terrors
and horrors been so poignantly brought to the attention of
the civilized world as they have today. There is one phe-
nomenon that clearly stands out at this time and that is
the aspect of mass communication. No matter what the event,
if there is someone to report it, it is likely to be well
known in a brief space of time. As a result, the human
element of war is In greater focus today than ever before
and its emotional asoects are transmitted to and felt by
millions of people almost as they occur. is awareness
of war has created for them an emotional involvement in
battles that not too many years ago would have been noted
only briefly with detached interest as something happening
to unknown persons in unpronounceable places. But war
today, and all of its attendant circumstances, are cast
in a new light, particularly for many persons in America
who have been neither the victims of, nor subjected to,
the violence of war.
It is thus in this light—that is to say—the acute,
emotional awareness of war and its evils--that I propose
my thesis. Conceding that war must have laws and that it
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submit at the same time thst the laws of war cannot be
inflexible, and the various rules such as those which
relate to a principle of quarter, especially, must have
permissible exceptions. Thus, it is my thesis that there
can be no unqualified rule that proscribes a denial of
quarter in every given instance. The decision whether
"to kill or give quarter*' has been the warrior's dilemma
as loner as "civilized 51 nations have warred against one
another. Attempts have been made to dispose of this
dilemma by issuing blanket proscriptions against a denial
of quarter under any circumstances, but I contend that
such attempts are unrealistic and unacceptable in light
of modern warfare.
Advances in the art of war have turned the land, sea
and air into one huge battleground. The whole world, and
potentially the entire universe, have been converted by
the genius of science into possible theatres of war. Our
next advance may well be combat in the outer reaches of
space which Is more than a mere possibility today, with
or without an answer to the UFO's. I propose that such
advances have reduced any attemot to codify an unqualified
3» Students and lovers of science fiction may find
the not so fictional book by Frank Edwards, FLHKG . SRS
SERIOUS BUSINESS (1966), thought provoking In this area.
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rule of quarter to a practical Impossibility, The cir-
cumstances which give rise to so-called "rules of land
warfare" are sometimes related and sometimes as distinct
fron those of naval warfare as both of these are, of neces-
sity, related and at the same time distinct from those of
aerial warfare with its rapidly changing concepts evoked
by jets, roclrets and missiles.
As a Marine officer, I am, hy virtue of the mission
of the "arine Corps, vitally interested in the three gen-
eral areas of combat—land, sea and air. Any student of
war, however, may find that it is essential to an under-
standing of the futility of attempting to lay down an in-
variable set of rules relating to quarter, to examine the
existing conventional and customary rules vis-a-vis the
practical application thereof as they relate to war on
land, on the sea and in the air. The variance in circum-
stances, modes of battle and practical considerations is
factually interesting as well as legally significant.
As convenient divisions, after a brief history of
quarter, I begin with combat on land, introduced by the
illustration in the prelude, and progress respectively
to naval and aerial warfare. The division is made essen-
tially to enable us to examine the shortcomings and
f
Inexactitudes of any unqualified rule of quarter as ap-
plied to each general area and tyoe of combat, I ursre
the reader to Veev in mind, however, that these areas
often overlap end a combination of ell ray well occur in
any combat situation.
k. For example, World War II, the Korean Conflict
and the War in Vietnam have seen many instances of combined




precise time can be attributed to • general pc-
ceptence of "quarter* as a principle of warfare, but Its
origins can be traced back in early history as far ae the
Greeks and Romans hundreds of yesrs before the coining of
Christ, history records thet some of the early war prac-
tices among the so-called civilizations of ancient tines
were for the most part unrestrained in cruelty, ferocity,
barbaric treatment and a general disregard of all consi-
derations, save the attainment of the belligerents* ob-
5Jectives by whatever Deans possible. The indiscriminate
slaughter of troops, camp followers, noma and children of
the Assyrians, Hebrews, Chinese, Hindus, Persians, Mace-
donians, Carthaginians and Greeks, and the Inhumane methods
of torture and death are grim precursors of the barbarism
of modern day Hitlers, iiimmlers and Tojos. Prisoners were
sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated and mercy refused
6to children and to the old and sickly.
m earlier wars of Rome as well were characterized by
such outrages. In the war against the Auruncians, 50 3 £• C.,
5. 2 Phillipson, The International Law and Customs of
Ancient Greece and Home, 203 (1911),









;ivin£, ) evidence to
the awareness of the concept at least. Prisoners were
•Hscriialnately slaughtered, and unbridled ferocity was
.m both during the conflict and after. In the Punic
war, no quarter was given to the Carthaginians. In the
war with the Samnites, in 320 3, C., it is related that
the Romans slew, without distinction those who offered
resistance and those who fled, those who were armed and
those who were defenseless, freemen and slaves, young and
7
old, men and cattle.
ie history of the ancient world is replete with such
umanity, and yet, in the last two hundred years before
Christ, there appeared an undercurrent of an appeal for
milder practices and the Greeks became the avant s- courri ers
of the less severe character of war. By any standards many
of the practices were still orutal, but there was an aware-
ness that the thirst for blood and slaughter were violative
of the inherent nature of man, and a supranational concent
relating to humane doctrines was finding seed. Prom time
to time, poets and philosophers, orators and historians
proclaimed these doctrines. Plato conceived a republic
based upon perfect Justice. Aristotle condemned the prin-
ciole of retaliation as being antagonistic to true Justice.






Euripedc- aks of »x©esfi >t only as acts of
Intrinsic wickedness and transgressions against universal
-, "but indeed, as suicidal folly >art of the of-
>r. Diodoru* observed that every war lias laws of some
ich Included the giving? of I if :.rter,that
Is, "not to InjUM suppliants who have throw; it
on the r-ercj of their victors »**
IHi HilMMim progressed ir. the humanities of warfare
even more rapidly than thl "re d enionstrated by the
end of the 3. C. era an advance well ahead of all other
ancient nations. "On t' w>le, we perceive further "iiti-
"ions, and more deliberate attempts to regularize belli
-
erent proceedings, and a greater disposition to insist on
and appeal to the sanctions of positive law, apart fr
10
•se of scored 1&W»
In a thesis of restricted, length, it is not possible
apt anything but a brief history of the underlyi:
theme, therefore, I must regrettably proceed from the in-
teresting ancient history of warfare and, leave the antiquities
8. Id, at 222.
9. Diodor, xxx 18,2.






•n forr-u! , there mil nlte
mess - .-r . 3 I of a denial of quarter
- under certain &ircumstances such
MM found in the ll of r -as
riled as i of retaO ion* The 1 forme*
def of the ancient la« of td Grata*
12
wes sanctioned as the Jua tallonls, i.e. an aye for an
cje, a limb for a llab« ". ' terical algalfleanoe lies
n not in when the concept arose, but rather in the fact
that it arose at all, .1 •peait now af a concept, not hard
t rules, I raise the point to emphasize the
awareness of the concept even among early civilisations,
including t I who were branded arbaric for the rest
rt«
lly the corcepts save way to more definitive
Lnoiples and Huig De Groot (whon we know and venerate
11, See Wright, Tha Doab it toaaeaua, m* J.
of Int. Law 263 at 266: "Does International law require the
Plication of laws of war to people of a different civilize,
tion? The ancient Israelites are said to have denied t
usual war restrictions to certain tribes. . . , the ancient
Greeks considered the rules of war, , • inapplicable to
barbarians, and medieval Christian civilization took a
siiailar attitude toward war With the infidel. n




under the latinized name of Hugo Grotius) gives evidence
that the concent of quarter had become a well develoned
principle of warfare by l6?5 A. B« in his celebrated wo
De ,1ure belli ac nacis llbri tres. Whatever moved Grotius
to conoose t-.he law of nations is not important to this
thesis. What is significant, inter alia , in his extra-
ordinary achievement, is that he recognized the evolution
of the concept and made it a solemn pronouncement in his
monumental work. Chapter XI, which deals with "Moderation
with Respect to the Right of Killing in a Lawful «&r, M
1?
devotes several sections to Quarter, 'Grotius contended
that:
» • • the surrender of those who yield
1190a condition that their lives be spared
ht not to be rejected, either in battle
or in sieged. , • The same sense of
justice bids that those be spared who yield
themselves unconditionally to the victor, or
who become suppliant, , , # *5 Against these
13. Section XIV concerns itself with "the surrender
of those who wish to yield upon fair terms should be ac-
cepted," Section XV deals with "those also who have sur-
rendered unconditionally should be spared
,
M Section XVI
concerns itself with the injustice of retaliation and a
denial of quarter. Sees Volume Two, The Translation, Book
1, by Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford, Clarendon Press, London,
1925).
14. Grotius, De Jure belli ae pacis libri tres (1625),
See translation cited In note 13> at o. ?39«








precepts of justice and the lew of nature
exceptions are frequently offered, which
ere by no means just, as for example, if
retaliation is required, . . • Yet he who
recalls whet has previously been said in
regard to valid reasons for putting to
death will easily perceive that such ex-
ceptions do not afford just grounds for
an execution. !^
The evolution was long; and painful, however, and many
heads were impaled on the lance, hundreds of thousands of
a«n, women and children were butchered, and the innocent
died the same slow agonizing deaths as the warriors. It
mattered not that they perhaps tried to surrender, or were
needlessly annihilated on orders of no quarter. Over the
centuries more persons died as victims of a barbaric ig-
noring of principles of warfare than can be recounted. It
was natural then as the ability to make war became more
sophisticated among "civilized nations" that standards of
conduct in warfare should evolve as well. We have come a
long way, and where it is possible to destroy hundreds of
thousands with one bomb, it is understandable that attempts
have been made to ameliorate the horrors of war as much as
possible. Thus today we find some humane concepts of war-














and the warriors. These include customary and moral
principles and attempts at codification of such principles
by international conventions.
A detailed discussion of these modern principles that
evolved to a so-called point of refinement In conventional
international law is presented in the areas that foil or.
One aspect which I wish to emphasize as part of the his-
torical development is that the conventional international
principles were apparently influenced by French attitudes.
i-ther this was good or bad remains to be seen, and I
raise no issue as to the calibre of the French either as
diplomats or soldiers. I only note that the language of
19the conventions as it relates to principles of quarter
fills me with certain misgivings. A literal reading of
Article 2° gives emphasis to the proposition that "thou
shalt not deny quarter" and if you do, the actor shall
find himself in the position of having to affirmatively
defend his conduct.
17. See U. S. DSPT OF ABI!Y, FIELD KAtrUAL 27-10, THE
LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) and LT . S. UkTX DEPi NT, PUB-
LICATI OK, NVI? 1.0-2, LAW OF NAVAL W/ I (U) (1959).
18. See Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, adopted by the i« Peace Conference
of 1907, hereinafter cited as Hague Regulations.











In fairness to the French, however, there are tmnj
writers who are Just as dc c in their approach to this
principle as is the language of the conventions. Percy
-iordwell in writing on the taking of Port Arthur by the
^a:r.ese and their refusal to give quarter remarked 5
The taking of Port Arthur was the one re-
grettable incident of the war on the part
of the Japanese, . . It was the torture
and mutilation of those Japanese who hap-
pened to he made prisoners during the
operations against Port Arthur which stung
their fellow countrymen into madness, «
explains, though nothing can excuse , the
massacres which were carried on by them
for four days after the place was taken,
213aty and fiorgan ' speak of the distinction between com-
batants and noncombatants and add:
> distinction is more vital to the conduct
of war and the amelioration of its horrors
than that which separates combatants from
nonoombatants.
. . . Each class has its
privileges—the combatant must, of course,
expect to be killed in combat, but he is
entitled to quarter if he throws down his
arms, and, if captured, he can claim to be
treated as a prisoner of war. 22
George s, Davis, a noted authority on International
Law, wrote in 19l6i
20. Bordwell, The Law of Mar between Belligerents,
118 (1903).
21. BatJ and or-ran, War Its Conduct and Legal Results,
171 (1915).





A belligerent cannot refuse to give
arter, nor cr.n he announce his inten-
. on to give no quarter, case
of some conduct of the enemy in gross
violation of the laws of war, and
only in the way of retaliation for
similar acts,?
A noted theologian writes:
.
. ruling of the natural law or,
at least, of the law of nations pertain-
ing bo warfare, forbids that a prisoner
of war be put to death unless he has first
been proved guilty of so..,. W9 crime
through a fair trial. ; prisoner of wer
is meant a soldier I as surrendered
or has been captured and is unable to
continue hostilities. Po kill a soloier
of the enemy after he has manifested his
desire to surrender is an act of murder,
unless there is good reason to believe he
is only pretending to give himself up and
is planning to turn against his captors. 25
In a leading authoritative treatise on International
Law, c the principle of quarter is clearly announced!
23. Davis, The Elements of International Law, 29? (^th
ed. 1916). On the issue of denial of quarter as a means of
reprisal and retaliation see Section VI, infra.
2^. Very Beverend Francis J. Connell, C. 3s. i., Std,
The Ethics of War (195^).
25* M« at 21. It appears that this seemingly simple
statement of theologian Connell actually raises several issues,
some of which argue against each other. Regrettably the an-
swer is not as easy as the theologian would like it to be. A
discussion of the moral aspects of quarter is included in sub-
sequent sections.
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-l -.l J..:.-„ to fight or to
resist capture, "hcrefore combatants dis-
:-• sickness or wou. ay not be
killed, Partner, such combatants as lay
lix Boa and surrender or do not
resist being made prisoners, may neither
be billed nor_'~ouiiced, but must be given
auarter. 27 ^emphasis added/.
The concept has thus descended down the bloody cen-
turies into a principle which at first blush aopears
uncomplicated. The implication® of its practical applica-
tion, however, are monumental, and the dogmatic approach
it some authorities ta«:e to the suggestion of a hard and
fast rule is disconcerting. This en be seen from the
modern consequences of alleged denials of quarter which
are reflected in war crime trials following the second
World War. During that war the German High Command issued
orders relating to commandos. The orders directed that
•Bibers of such units were to be executed, even though in
uniform and notwithstanding that they might attempt to
surrender. At the war trials, findings of fact were
27. Id. at 33S.
23. Sev l Iter Crimes Reports J3 U9^6). ftm order pro-
vided, among other things: "Henceforth all enemy troops en-
countered by German troons during so-called commando ooera-
tions, in Europe or in Africa, though they appear in uniform,
armed or unarmed, are to be exterminated to the last man,
either in combat or in pursuit. It matters not in the least
whether they have been landed by ships or planes or dropoed
by parachute. If such men aopear to be about to surrender,
no quarter should be given to them on general principle."
16
--n





or wrongly, rtain accused, incluc .-lief of
the G '-._..", who pwmalfffKtm •• orders or
who eff ec busted th«B were guilty . riuc, case
of General Jos tier' decided in • by a United states
Llltary C . ssion is illustrative, it accused was found
xlty and condaoned to death for ordering, in pursuance of
a above-mentioned order, the shooting of fifteen American
prisoners of war who were landed two hundred and fifty miles
behind the front in Italy, in uniform, and were engaged in
demolishing a tunnel and railway, in I$M*5 a Canadian Mili-
tary Court convicted and sentenced to death one ;.urt 'Meyer,
a commander ti ..erman Hegiment, 'for having incited his
10
troops to deny quarter to Allied troops.
In short the concept of quarter has colic a long way
from the bloody battlefields of ancient Greece and Rome so
that today it is more than just e concept, it is a principle
of international law, the violation of which makes the
29. Id. et 22-33.




violr war criminal, for which he can be sentenced to
• ultimate penalty by the "vie , consequence of
such magnitude compels e close examination of this principle
of law, and further compels inquiry as to whether such orin-
ciple is right or wrons , The ouestlon is, can there logically
and rightfully exist an unqualified rule of quarter as t
principle relates to modern warfare, as we have known war—
as we are presently entered in it—and as we prepare for .1





VIS-A-VIS TIL CI '-L1:-: O r LA !-- V' - ~T
In the orelude we were introduced to Sergeant Christian
%
ulestl of the German Army, one of Irwin Shaw*s "loung Lions.
Tactically Christian was in a bind, lie had lost most of his
company and his commanding officer. MM the remaining
ranking person trying to lead the remnants of his company out
of an encircled position. He had no forces to accomplish the
ing of prisoners and his primary mission was the withdrawal
of his men out of the trap, '.is actions in shoot ins? the two
paratroopers who were trying to free the man caught in the
tree were legitimate acts of war. They were enemy oombatants
and had not fallen into his power. But what of the third man
dangling by his harness six feet off the ground? Certainly
he had been temporarily rendered hors de combat , but by no
means had it been by his own choice, nor did he seek or offer
to surrender himself. On the contrary, he rather courageously,
but foolishly, demanded the inconceivable. He demanded the
surrender of an enemy who held the upper hand. Perhaps in
the technical sense you might say he "had fallen into the
power of his enemy," but it is obvious that his will to resist
31. Shaw on cjt . supra note 2.
19
9ti
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had not "been altered, and that he would continue to resist
at every given opportunity. Bfl was he to live or die?
allow him to live and remain in the tree was potentially
dangerous to Christian and his men, since the xmratrooner
ht be freed shortly after the Germans had passed and their
route of escape would be revealed. To tal-.e him prisoner
v*ould be difficult and possibly defeat the orderly withdrawal
from the trap. What other choice was left in reality but
to Vill him? The man was brave (albeit reckless) Kind could
hardly have been considered e prisoner of war per se, merely
because of his misfortune in getting caught In the tree.
he really any different while hanging in the tree than any
other hostile combatant descend in parachute upon whoa
^2
the "laws of war" do not prohibit firing?- Was there ac-
tually an "illegal" denial of quarter in the conventional
sense?
tit answer, of course, is not clear cut, but an examir,: -
tlon of the principles of quarter and the form in which they
are enunciated today will be helpful in arriving at an appro-
priate answer.
32. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ARWY PHLET 27-10, "i 1 ffl£ LAW
OF LAND Hi . (1956), Sec. II, paragraph 30: law of
war does not prohibit firing upon paratroopers or other
persons who are or appear to be bound upon hostile missions





The evolvement of the concept of !er into
pie of oustomary law ultimately re d in i coc1 '
'on of the principle as a restatement of Internatio
13
-
These conventions provide that?
B the prohibitions provided by Special
Conventions, it is especially prohibited
(a)
(b)
• » o •
• • •
(c) To kill or wound an enemy who,
having It id down /)il^/ errs, or having no longer
means of defense, has surrendered at discretion;
^ (d) To declare that no quarter will be
..ven;
The first codification of a body of rules governing
land warfare was a document authored and compiled by Dr.
Francis Lieber, entitled Instructions for the Government of
33» Art. 23(c) and (d), Hague Regulations,
34, Ibid. Article 23 corresponds exactly, aside from
some changes of wording, to Article 13 of the Declaration of
Brumal* of 137/4. The Geneva Conventions of 1929 &n£ 19^9 re-
lating to the Treatment of Prisoners of liar are silent as to
quarter per se. By inference, however, it is noted that the
proscriptions of Hague remain in full force and effect,
serious question as to use of a denial of quarter as a means
of reprisal remains unanswered in any of the conventions.
Article 50 of the Hague Convention of 1907 which reads, "No
general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted
uoon the population on account of the acts of individuals
for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally
responsible, M is the only article which implies a use of
reprisal in this sense, but its language falls far short of
a proscription in this regard.
21

rale s of the United States in the ?lel d , General Ord ers
^. 100, Aoril ?>, 1863* It %-w.s generally known as the "Lieber
Code.'' is monumental worV: formed the has in and inspiration
for the Brussels Declaration of 1874 which in turn served as
3*5
the foundation for the Hague Conventions of 1S99 and 1907.
The Lieber Code provided Agftliurt | refusal to give quarter
except under certain circumstances, such as a commander being
in "great straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible
36
to cumber himself with prisoners," or as a fora of reprisal
37
when it is known that enemy trooos gire none, or when enemy
troops "fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any
plain striding, and uniform mark of distinction of their
ami."
As a result of the flat prohibition against declaring
that no quarter would be given as contained in Article 23(c)
and (d) of the Hague Regulations of 1907, Lieber* s Code has
been modified significantly in the current United States
35. II Opoenhelm's International Law (?th ed,,
Lauterpaoht) 228 (1952)
•
36. Lieber, art. 60.
37. Lieber, art. 62.




>Tth "The Law of Land Warfare,
and no l are swelled Out* It is interesting to
note that the li Lthout qualification, but no
satisfactory explanation for this is available in the mili-
tary archive**. I suspect that drafters of the manual
tried to sti lose to the international convention
as possible, and as a result were mreoccupied with a desire
to simplify the rules of conduct relating to land warfare.
The question is not always this easy, however, for tne
man engaged in bitter combat. It is an obvious truism that
as long as soldier fights &nd resists he may be killed.
r is cruel &nrt it is painful to see human blood ebhir
away, but during the n&ssion of battle there is little time
for sentiment or pity by one combatant towards another.
Sir The: ?rclay, in his preface to International Law and
41
Practice , wrote somewhat optimistically that:
39. U. S, DEPAir: 2?-10, THE U
0? LAHD VABFABB (1956). Paragraph 23 reads; Refusal of
Quarter. It is especially forbidden * * * to declare t';
no Quarter will be given. Paragraph 29 reads: Injury
Forbidden After Surrender. It is especially forbidden * * *
to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms,
or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at
discretion.
40. Ibid .
41. Sweet and Kaxwell, Ltd. (London 191*7 ).
23
mm




- are - Losle of ^f;iov i , d,
while the excitement lasts, nations are just
.'..dividual r in the- i
of i violent rrel • That the excitement
aSt itself arid men will return to
normal state of mind and see things in their
proper proportion* is as certain as the pi
of action and reaction in the course of
th: i© in general •
are concerned, however, with precise t in
ie when, in the heat of battle, the soldier, be he tt
mmsaSLmx or private, must decide to kill or capture. It
is at this moment that the practical issues relating to
quarter genuinely arise, I i stated above, it |i
Ing to note that no ready solution is offered or suggested
by the '"codes" that at present proscribe a denial of quarter
without qualification. It would appear more reasonable to
suggest that such general prohibitions should not I 9 not
exclude every hypothesis of an actual denial of quarter,
particularly in a fast moving attack where the subtle dis-
tinctions between discretion and valor are not easy to
distinguish.
Before pursuing this point, however, an examination of
the practical considerations involved in the granting or
denial of quarter is essential in the evaluation of the legal
principles concerned. It is immediately apparent that these






practical aspects must include, inter alia , a consideration
of the tactical, political and economic factors. The tac-
tical features are the most significant, and I thus defer
their discussion until the completion of a brief comment on
the politics! and economic aspects.
Politically speaking, a general denial of quarter would
be fatal in this day of mass communication. While our country
is presently enp;Bged in a substantial war against Communist
aggression, we are enjoined more than ever before to observe
and practice the humanities of war, anamolous as these terms
may be. It is not my thesis to advocate under any circum-
stances a general denial of quarter, and I concur whole-
heartedly in an unequivocal proscription of such conduct.
If we of the armed forces are to represent truly democratic
attitudes towards the rest of the world, we must certainly
bear in mind the dignity of our fellow beings, whether friend
or foe, and respect the inherent right to life under appro-
priate conditions . Thus, both from the moral principles and
the political factors, we find ourselves in the spotlight and
the repercussions of a general denial of quarter as a doctrine
of war would be disastrous for the cause of freedom and
democracy.
On the other hand there are definite reasons why a blanket
proscription against a denial of quarter under certain "reasonable
25
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circumstances" is as eaually Impractical • As noted in
Lleber's Code, J a commander was permitted to direct his
trooos to rive no quarter, if he found himself in srreat
straits, and when his own salvation made it impossible to
cumber himself with prisoners. This impossible situation
can, and often does, arise from tactical and economic reasons,
onomy of forces and materials dictates not only the unfeas-
ability of taking prisoners but, more often than not, the
impossibility thereof. A fast moving attack unto a final
objective which requires the taking of one or more inter-
mediete objectives calls for a maximum economy of forces.
Quite often such combat involves understrength units to be-
f?in with, and it is unrealistic to suggest that prisoners
should be made of enemy personnel on the intermediate objec-
tives. An enemy with a will to resist is at best a reluctant
prisoner, and a large number of such prisoners can create a
serious, if not fatal, loss of available combat troops who
would have to be employed as guards. Under such circum-
stances you obviously also could not release these persons
on the intermediate objective.










Bv«j r:ore acute is the situr.tior. behind the lines. A
combat patrol Is seldom in a nocition to take more than a
handful of prisoners required for interrogation purposes,
/• reoonnaisance r>atrol rarely, if ever, can afford to take
any prisoners. Whet then of the situation where a large
number of the enemy desires to surrender, either to the
patrol behind the lines or to the unit in the attack over
an intermediate objective where exploitation of success
demands a continued advance to the main objective. In each
situation the enemy has not attained the precise status of
a prisoner of war, since there is that brief moment in time
that divides the combatant from the prisoner. The difficult
decision, the warrior's dilemma, arises at this very instant.
The controlling convention defines prisoners of war
as persons of a certain category who have "fallen into the
M
oower of the enemy." The quoted language replaced the
word "captured" which appeared in the 1929 conventions, os-
tensibly to preclude any ambiguity. Does it really accomplish
this? VTnen has such person "fallen into the power of the
4k. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 19^9 , III t Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
**5» Ibid , art. 4A.
27






enemy Is it when he, the pot en prisoner, decides
at his discretion to quit? Or is it only when his total
ability to resist is overcome despite his continued will to
resist? In a fast moving attack or ot'.er situation pre-
carious to the accomplishment of the mission, there is often
no clear cut distinction, and seldom, if ever, is there a
rule of thumb available to analyze the situation. The words
may have been intended to preclude any ambiguity, but it is
doubtful that the efficacy desired hy the language was ac-
tually obtained,
is leads then to a consideration of the tactical, as-
pects which were illustrated in part in the foregoing portions,
otwithstanding other motivations, be they political, economic
or moral, it is the tactical pressure of combat that controls
most decisions relating to quarter. Certainly it is easy to
sit at the conference table, where hindsight is 20/20, and
reflect on the horrors of war. rut in reality, it is the
man on the spot who must decide. What then of the warrior
who is stirred by the "noise of battle, and. the sight of the
dead and dying, and the feelings of weariness after long
hardships, who is weakened in his sense of fairness or driven
to excesses out of constant fear of imminent death and thus







46fro ™t cup of Dei . s la the v whom
the lMras really roouse*«
i fully appreciate the tactical aspects, it is neeee*
iry to briefly inquire into " fcancee undex which
thi rale of quarter is '.cable. 1 though digressing
•lightly, an tzaainatloa of some of the basic definitions
• : distinctions is eopronr" as to lay the foundation
for a critique of the law of quarter as it applies bo the
rious situations. J believe the following definition
Mhlfth include counter-insurgency, are particularly timely
today in light of the significant conflicts in Southeast
/'si a and South AaerlOl .
""he definition of international war , or war between
international states, is by far the most obvious and least
troublesome. It r.sy not always be a declared war, but its
fen is generally unmistakable and is easily recognizable.
ithout attempting • definition that is all inclusive, it
"fleer to ray that such war is the exercise of violence by
state or International body politic against another. It
is
» lp-ter alia , a means of implementing political policy by
violence.
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f *.-
cy, on fch* other , is not always easy to
reco~ni~e. One of the I r definition-
It contained in ! mt t-- by J*] nstay, Major,
[?SAF, to the effect:
Th* tern, insurgency warfare • • •
refers to that composite conflict phenom-
enon which can be defined, i 3 ,: r
development of resistance against an in-
OUabent political rehire tfhleh expands
from the initial stage of subversion
—
infiltration through the interne-
stages of overt resistance by small armed
banal end. Insurrection to final fruition
in civil war. ^8
As a logical sequitur, count erlnsurgency can then be
defined, as those doctrines, instrumentalities and measures,
political, economic, psychological, civic and military ,
which are designed and. employed to aid in the prevent 1 on
of insurgency warfare, 1 emphasize the words military and
prevention to illustrate that the prevention of insurgency
often takes the form of military action as a means of counter-
insurgency. The answer to the question as to whether the
rules of warfare apply to insurgencies and counter insurgen-
cies lies somewhere between two extremes. On one hand you
b?» Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare (Free Press,
New York 1965).





a snaliaw ^o as
those of
Colou ml irrllla* 11 MP ir:- r
bodier- or persone n«t foixlng ^r* of the or^ani rod
-ces of a belligerent, or ooeratin- under the orders of
its established earn --nders, -ore not, in general, recognized
i legitimate troons or entitled, when n, to bi-
as oris oners of vT?r, but may unon capture be summarily
punished even with death. T
Also Secretary of State Stimson declared in 1929 that,
"non-re co
;
-rni zed rebels have no international le~al status. ,
They are from the standpoint of le^al princinle. . . in no
better nosltion than ordinary outlaws and bandits."^ fta
other hand "the four Geneva Conventions of 19^9 orovide
uniformly that in the case of an UM«d conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one
of the partial to the Convention each party shall be bound
to apnly, as a minimum, certain humanitarian provisions of
fundamental character,"* such as quarter, nrlsoner of
'49. ..'Inthroo's Military Lavr and Precedents (2d ed.)
733 (1920).
50. I staclcworth, Digest of International Law 325
(19^0).
51. See Article 3» common to all four Geneva Con-




• of i: :'-". -•( rnrtlov
.let L 1 -
felon thsti
ividual guerrillrs rre entitled to
full combatant status . They need not
be in possession of Say identifiers tic
or authorization to that effect. It
is sufficient that they belos feo ffxx£?
organized movement, and, of course, be
under the command of a person responsi-
ble for his subordinates. 53 (Emphasis
led,
)
:-h combatant status would thus: afford the guerri" 11
rights of any other s- r in war, inclu/ •"_ rter.
Considering the two extremes, I contend that the
forces in any insurgency, counter-insurgency or
guerrilla type warfare for all practical purposes should
treat each other as combatants for purposes of the laws of
warfare, and should observe the laws and customs of war so
long as they are under responsible commanders and are sp-
parently at least one step above the bandit or brigand. An
example of the problems that can arise in this area concerns
incident in the Philippines in 1901, which formed the
basis of an interesting book by Joseoh L, Schoff,
52, A Study by the Institute of World Polity, "idmund
A, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,
April 1?65.
53, Id* ** 1?3»












. 3, Allay , fc< ey
:ar. . Hurt
e, tol "lor: "I • I 1 '.
you to fcll! bum, the more ill and burr. : I M?
In the course of his duties, 'Jailer fluid a detac'
of .50 mariner :rtooh t< eh across tha outnem part
Samar fron Lammg i' wgr throw chart ed Jr.
consequence of starting without ad.. J rations, 12 AM
died and ''all: rand up in the hospital at BftAOjr*
Lie there ,cne runnin fever, it MM reported to
er of the natives had behaved treaeherousl ;
.
:ler approved the recommendation that they I I 11
of them -,-7ere shot accordingly and without trial. Waller
sorted to General Smith that "it became necessary to
expend, eleven prisoners." aller was subsequently
- rged with and court-martialed for murder. While refusing






arave the order to shoo
, Her conducted hi? "in-
adequate" defense but fortunately m itted by the
court based upon a defense of obedience to orders, among
er things* r court-nartial was later held to
he Without jurisdiction and an attempt to retry Major tallar
by a Navy court-martial was struct down by ederal Courts
in habeas corpus oroceedings in 1915.
The importance of Major Waller's court-martial lies not
in his original acquittal, inter alia, on the basis of his
obedience to orders, but in the fact that he was tried for
a violation of the laws of warfare relative to the circv
;ces at hand. It can be inferred that the victims were
entitled to the status of combatants and commensurate treat-
ment pursuant to international principles. They were not
T.ere bandits, and had apparently achieved a status which
demanded a more favored treatment.
As a final consideration, the status of belligerency
is appropriate. When the elements of insurrection are
manifest, a third state may legally proceed with reco/rnltion
of belligerency. This is done by a declaration of neutrality
which puts both parties in a civil war in the legal position
of belligerents in relation to the recognizing state . The






in a United sense, a status of international personality,
felon by a third state is the V:ey to belligerency.
Thus we have examined the various circumstances under
which the rules of war, particularly quarter, would have
today. '"his brings us bac^ then to the practical
question of the warrior's dilemma, to kill or capture, and a
55
critical analysis of the codified rules as they exist to .
Prom an unsigned notebook of a German soldier the fol-
lowing lines were extracted:
We destroyed eight houses with their inmates.
In one of thM two MM with their wives and
a girl of eighteen were bayoneted. Tne little
one almost unnerved me so innocent was her
expression. But it was impossible to ehec>:
the crowd, so excited were they , for in such e
^
moments you are no longer men nut wild beasts . J ~
Quite obviously the problem of eliminating the horrors
of war is incapable of resolve, particularly during the
passion of battle, by trying to outlaw it through impracti-
cal restrictions. Well intended though they may be, the
delegates to international conventions cannot hope to amelio-
rate the sufferings of war by trying to legislate its practices
55* See Art. 23(c) and (d), Hague Regulations, cited
above.
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DM
*
out of axil e. War often beco : are inhumane as the
:)ons become more sophisticated, Wherein \: \e logio
of a rule against "dum-dum" "bullets, which says nothing of
nuclear bombs or napalm? Such approaches are unrealistic
and it is little wonder that modem military attitudes arose
such as
:
Whoever uses force, without any considera-
tion and without sparing blood, has sooner
or later the advantage if the enemy does not
proceed in the same way. One cannot intro-
duce a principle of moderation into the
philosophy of war without committing an ab-
surdity. It is a vain and erroneous tendency
to wish to neglect the element of brutality
in war merely because we dislike it, . . .57
Svery means of war without which the object
of the war cannot be obtained is permissible. • • .
It follows from these universally valid prin-
ciples that wide limits are left to the sub-
jective freedom and ^arbitrary Judgment of the
Commanding Officer. Jw
As previously stated, the convent it rial rules of war-
fare dealing with quarter today contain no saving clauses,
and the obligation to give quarter is imposed In the widest
terms. Bat it had been for centuries a legal principle and
realistic maxim of war that a weaker force forfeits all claims
57 • Clausewitz, Vom Kriecje (Vol. I) k and 5,








to mercy m it rec persists in defending a hopelt.
position against a superior force end it rr I to ac-
cept reaso: it ions of surrender and undertakes to
ede the x'onrecs of an enemy which it is unable to resist.
Why then should the modern codified rule be so inflexible?
II* t the greatest good accomplished by the demand for sur-
render or else face the consequence of total forfeiture of
all life in a situation where victory by the beseiged is
hopeless and thus more lives are spared ultimately on both
sides? I liken this to the decision former Presid; rui&an
had to make to use the atom bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
even though the estimate of potential loss of life to .Japan
was 100,000 plus, Wasn't it better to sacrifice 100,000
lives la order to save a million or more on each side by
forcing surrender and ending the war abruptly, without having
to invade Japan? Wherein lies the difference of forcing a
surrender through the promise of certain death if the weaker
enemy foolishly resists ultimate defeat? Such obstinance
promotes a greater number of casualties to both sides.
The proponents of hard and fast rules concerning the
conduct of war often raise the moral issues, but if there
ever was an area where theologians disagree, it is here.




or potential injury will justify men in making use of
force, both before and after it is committed.
An injury justifies the use of force,
before it is committed, in order to
guard against its and it justifies s
like use of force after it is oommitted,
in order, either to recover what is lost
by it, or to hinder him, who has done it,
from doing the like again. Now the use
of force is war t and consequently the
law of nature, since it allows the use
of force for any of these purposes,
allows war . 59 ^mphasis added/.
While I sympathize with the expression that the rules,
although not qualified in their language, may be nonethe-
less subject to certain exceptions (Gf. , section on re-
prisals infra ), it is the business of burdening the accused
with the proposition of having to affirmatively defend his
conduct that is distressing.
Some proponents argue that it is only the ranking
officials who will have to answer for so-called war crimes
and. the common soldier seldom, if ever, suffers such fate.
I suggest that such is not the case, however, and there
have been many courts-martial and other trials held on
lower ranks for such offenses. Perhaps the plea of obe-
dience to orders is not well taken when made by Generals,







finals and Colonels who rre supposed to *have known the
situation" of Illegal orders. But the problem arises with
the unknowing soldier Mho, without pens rca . violated the
laws of war pursuant to orders that hec purported, without
grounds, to Justify the offense under the pretext of their
constituting i reprisal for the enemy's crimes, sueii as
the infamous Commando order cited above. Added to this is
the plea of necessity to obey the order , since such as the
Commando order contained a threat of serious minishment in
instances of noncompliance, including loss of one's own
life. How much of this was decided at Nuremberg? i ccord-
61ing to August Von Xnieriem none of it was. In his ex-
cellent account of the war crimes trials he sums up this
sorry situation thuslyi
Yet this judgment stands on a high level
when one compares it with those rendered by
Ltlah military tribunals. In Nuremberg
the accused were high generals who could be
supposed to h&ve known the situation,
among those who were tried and sentenced by
the British tribunals were privates who
could not \mow with the best of intentions
what the commando missions were doing and
who had completely to rely upon the
60. See Einstein, The Defence of Obedience to
oerior Orders in International Law (Leyden, 1965).









superiors, is information was bound
the fee"
Commando Order was a lawful measure
u fcrei ler, unsoldierly
cruelty, and deceit, "hey could not
fco do wror ! ing
it.
All the same, privates and police-
men were convicted Their cases illus-
trate the consequences of the opinion
Germany's enemies were irrelevant, as
13 us of the
which the problems of the Conmando
Order had treated in "uremberg.
A brief report of a few of these cases
will serve to illustrate thai
consequences.
ie men, for instance, were in-
3 ved in the so-c *raudui »e,
""hey were policemen and detectives
transferred to rity S©rvi<
in the course of the war. One day
III received the order in
rway to take part in the execution
of several men sentenced to death by
illtary tribunal. vhey then found
'ms elves in front of several men,
wearing sweaters or blue jeans, and
shot ' at the order of their £
Colonel (:iauPtsturmfuehrer) •
os over did they learn
that the men shot had been members of
i eoamando mis.? ion who, wearing ci-
vilian clothes, had been brought to
Norway in a sailboat to bio;"- up a
factory. They also learned that
re was no sentence of a military
tribunal but that the procedure had
been based on the Commando Order.
All, including those who had done
nothing but cordon off the place of
•
re 84 rs
imprisonment In a penitentiary
,
Another German soldier was ordered
x
- r 1 • f bodle* lr. ^o
renove them. He did not do anything
el s • • lo 1
5
imprisonment in a penitentiary,
A. driver h&d brought the burial
co to ^he plane of «x#eut 'here
the shot men were supposed to be buried,
' to 1 rs Inprise
Mat lr e penitentiary
.
In connection with the Commando
Order, Britis! -ry cou- ed
111 death sentences which were also exe-
,
5 -ertero^s of imprls it for





the legal problems discussed above were
cor n#d In any o*t« of •«
TJone of these military tribunals seems
to h*v« 'ned whether the defendants
ought to have been acquitted because
the Commando Order KM not illegal or
because at least it was not exclusively
intenfec? for criminal purpose r, so that
the soldiers had to imple: it 8S a
PUpftrtOT order, or because It wee at least
motivated in such e way that no soldier
who had implemented it cor been
conscious of doing vrong. Ssd, indeed,
a the cr
-embers methods of administer!*
justice. o2
62. Id. at ^F-> ?9.
":
, ;>
> - ' res under-
- « pr v - ' WW t» cor.-
Froa the '•;-.'
;y - fch« 1 • II I for
ona of these prlnc* -o.es, that -he emphas;
-r an eve too
restrictiv i d t too impractical, if not
Impossible at times. Tin . zed
exception* to $1 i rfcer " '. stic
• well founded I sustained
combat, »rt«* I ttualifcy may he difficult to
mft since an atfc '- to
instantane i control « Of force
will cor I fee I " - -> ord.er to
surrender I.veil* quarter right-
fully raght be ref ©s wtie continue to
resist.
p to & t , inferior
enemy who H beeelged by e a 'or fo i aeana of
forcing their surrender and thereby saving as many lives as
possible by avoiding orolone-e:1 but useless resistance w®s
cited above. Denial of quarter a Issats seane of
I
-
- llustration of these
•••
oases, and others, which were the classical exceptions to
quarter is made to emphasize fetat obvious shortc s of
the language of the Hague regulations. Lieber* s Code may
not have been a masterpiece, but it was a good beginnin
and considerably more realistic than the current conventions
and field manuals setting forth the so-called Laws of H
fare, Lieber spelled out the exceptions as well as the rule ,
and as a result his code, albeit. Imperfect, was capable of
a more exact interpretation and understanding by the co
raander and the individual soldier.
There is no explanation in any of the reports of con-
ferences held in conjunction with the Brussels Declsration
or the Hague Conventions as to why the exceptions laid down.
in Lieber* s Code were not incorporated into those documents.
I suspect it was the French influence where the emphasis is
on the codification of the so-called principle with little
or no regard given to a codification of the exceptions. As
noted above, this places the actor in the undesirable and
sometimes fatal position of having to affirmatively defend
his conduct if he is to get out from under the harshness of
the uncompromising language. I have always felt that the
ten commandments were necessary but dangerously understated.
While it's true that "thou shalt not kill" might Br>pear
^3










obvious on the surface, it does?!** tell the whole story.
It se- ore precise and more preferred to command "thou
shalt not wrongfully kill—or thou shalt not intentionally
or negligently kill except in defense of person or property,"
It seems that a lot of the confusion and gross injustices
demonstrated at Nuremberg and Tokyo could be avoided by pro-
viding flexibility in the language of the Laws of Warfare
to take into consideration the exceptions. The idea of
punishing soldiers for conduct in carrying out certain crim-
inal orders, even though they themselves knew nothing of the
circumstances and entertained no mens rea whatsoever, is
repugnant. While war crimes trials may serve the ends of
Justice in some instances, I fear they all too often serve-
as nothing more than instruments of retaliation
defeated enemy, and establish a dangerous precedent not jus-
tified in law or custom. I substantial reason for such mis-
carriages of justice, as noted in the cases of the commando
order set forth above, is the lack of flexible rules of
war. *hile it is conceded that more definitive language
relating to the Law of Warfare certainly won't orevent in-
justice per se, it surely would be a step in the right






direction. ot only would It Aid the warrior to know the
rules under which he must operate nil grin business, but
alleged violations of such rule? would be easier to determine
and their ultimate elimination from the conduct of war that
much closer. I would like to think t e could eliminate
war itself and thus the need for any rules of warfare would
be automatically extinguished. ~rhaps someday we will
arrive at this ideal position, but until then, if we are
to nro.iress in the humanities of war, it will be by definitive
rules. And by this I mean rules that take into consideration
the realities of combat, and not those which are couched in






vis-a-vis trd ?"" " o ; mFFl ' ' d
ry 19' tf Secretary of Defense presented
the annual defense budget to the Douse Committee on Defense
Appropriation* A other comments on curr> roble
such as Vietnam, r.r. r.ara made a point thr almost
gone unnoticed except for a few alert authors. o secre-
tary commented, "There is one possible contingency which may
require the large-scale employment of our naval forces; 3.n6
that is a war at sea not involving any land battles." Thus
was projected in a budget message for the first I since
If II the prospect of a 100D Uaval war.
The notion of "a war at sea not involving any lend
battles," which saw fruition in the second World War, illus-
trates the need for certain rules or laws of naval warfare
which are of necessity distinct in part from land warfare
because of the very nature of ships and naval engagements.
The nuclear-powered submarine, for example, will certainly
create new naval tactics.
It cannot only hide in the sea, as can
any submarine, but it can stay hidden
and continue to operate aggressively for
virtually as lo s its commander sees
64. See Eliot, Will the Soviets Provoke a War at Sea? t




fit. It milmitod (for all practical
purposes) world-wide submerged endurance
at high speed. It need not sur-
face regularly, It Cannot be detected
vi' I ^ircraf 4", or :
our deadliest, tools stains t the German
untried but immensely formidable factor
sea Warfare#c5
M septs In nsrral warfare were devolonod in t
Second './orld Mar and hart reached pcirt of considerable
sophistication today with the Polaril KlSSile. ''ow-
ing r '3 illustrative. Or 14 Nkj 19^6, Captai-- ther
~sler, of the German f'avy, was called as a witness in the
trial of Admiral Karl Doaaitl vefore the Int' J onal Kill-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany, reply to counse1 '
s
questions concerning* certain practices of f T-boat commanders
during World War II, the following testimony was elicited*
Did your personal experience with
torpedoed shins dispose you to
caution with regard to rescue
measures?
HKSSLEri: Yes, The experienced U-boat
commander was justifiably suspicious of
every merchantman and its crew, no matter
how innocent they might appear. In two
cases this attitude of suspicion saved
me from destruction.
This happened in the case of the
steamer Galenas , • British 10,000 ton ship
which I torpedoed north of Cane Verde. The
65. Id. at l?.
hi
'
ship had stopped after be : it by the
torpedo, '"'he crew had left the ship and
ra in the lifeboats, and tht vessel
seemed to be sinking;. I was wondering
• er to surface I ' p.t at ler.st to
give the crew their position and ask if
- ci . k fcell - I
could not explain kept me from doing so.
I raiser3 | -1 scope to the full
extent and Just as the periscope rose
ftlaoat entirely out of the water,
sailors who had been hiding under the
ii snd behind tht bulwark, J ' up,
canned the guns of the vessel—which
far had appeared to be entirely
abandoned—and opened fire on my peri-
scope at very close i , compelli
me to submerge at full soeed. The
shells fell close to the periscope
but were not dangerous to me.
In the second case, the steamer
/Ifred Jones , which I torpedoed off
Freetown, also seemed to be sinking.
I wondered whether to surface, when I
saw in one of the lifeboats sailors
of the British Kevy in full uniform.
That aroused my suspicions. I inspected
the ship at close range— I would say f
a distance of .50 to 100 meters and es-
tablished the fact that it had not be
abandoned, but that soldiers were still
concealed aboard her in every possible
hiding-place and behind boarding. >dh®n
I torpedoed the ship this boarding was
smashed. I saw that the ship had at
least four to six guns of 10 and 15
centimeter caliber and a large number
of depth-charge chutes and anti-
aircraft guns behind the bulwarks.
Only a pure accident, the fact tlv
the depth charges had not been timed,
saved me from destruction.
was clear to me, naturally,
after such an experience, that I could
48
lAUhttf i a :;•':.,« \vr ' " ' 3 >N ftfl a ferfft
!riw—!»•!• snina »r
no ccncerr or
surviyors without endangering my own
eeler*fl points u interesting;
develooner. - " I .0 nav rfare, and that if ^he
t of roe*a at * . the! scaptabllltj part of
interne fcional custo^. d thai ire e&ployi
in er-ch instance, oic'er customr of the 1 raid require
the U-boat commander rent quarter to the crews of the
'
--essels. In this frame of reference {viz c;
concepts), as well as the situation of the possibility of
100* naval vr.r, it is apparent that consideration of certain
rules o. fare as they relate to naval o n tions is essen-
tial bo- to their individual aspects and how they contrast
niflcantly vita rules relating to land battles.
rule of quarter if vabtedly coaler to follow in
naval warf 1 with combat on land. finite signals,
barring ruses, indicating surrender are nrovided by customary
law of the sea and by convention. There is none of the hard
charging of bodies In the heat of battle which is difficult
to stop and control as there is in land warfare. The momentum
of a naval engagement is easier to certain than is the
combat assault of tanks and foot soldiers. Out of sheer




necessity there are o.occialijcd rui33 of land, naval and
aerial warfare which cannot "be applied oy ana to each
other, .or c^araple, s jr ruses o. ally
permit;ted in naval warfare, *•&•, snrpristS, fj
leadi. ........ fl l&lfi, as^ of the 3,
use of dum.. I LpS ana aircraft, and tne ill i,
just to OflBC a few. ..y ;;ay of contrast fv
and relate-.. *.ers are strictly i'oroi oy custoca in
aerial warfare, The laws and castors of the sea art H#1X
establisned and the concepts ot nival we Ithou
emerging nave not been as quice to c u lave "been those
of aerial and land warfare.
Ml customary law of the sea has teen 00 withhold the
firing on a belligerent snip who has struct the signal of
surrender, and to rescue survivors und&r circumstances of
urgency. The withholding of trie fire ui)on receiving the
proper signal is no doubt easier to do than it is on land,
but the question of survivors often presents a bigger problem.
The particular characteristics of the vessels concerned and
the tactical mission at hand £&y make the collection of sur-
vivors impossible, such as with submarine warfare. The
question of the survivors' ultimate rescue and return to









rescuing members of ships sun'' . • « this
. • . righting capsized life boats. • .
'
fm • . Hi
measures contradict the most primitive
ids of i " . '- ere
should be destroyed,"7
The order, when followed to its obvious ultimate, was held
in Admiral l^oenitz's case to be criminal and convictions
in his case and others followed World War II.
• history of international law, particularly since
the sixteenth century, is concerned to some extent about
the limits imposed by law upon the conduct of naval warfare.
Such questions are not always easy to interpret, particularly
since most naval engagements do not take place within the
territory of some international state, but rather occur in
a sort of Hno man's land" on the high seas. Let us then
take a loo): at the issue of quarter in our consideration
of the conduct of naval warfare.
e codification of the concept of quarter as a prin-
ciple of customary international law was presented in the
previous section. The Litber Code relating to instructions
6?. 5 War Crimes heports 233 (19^3).














refuse quarter to any enemy who has sur~
:. r,
It is forbidden either to continue to
r-
craft which have clearly indicated a
the survivors of such vessels end air-
ormft to
defend themselves. 70
Section 320b(ll) of that oublioation declares a




' an interesting cc u is contained in
footnote 3^ cited therein. The footnote refers to Article 23,
paragraphs (c) and (d) of the Hague Bagull.tions, but then goes
on to qualify the Hague Article with the following afterthou:
69. ". S. ':AV: Z 10-2,
.sreinafter referred to as
IWIf 10- .
70. Id. Kt 5-7 (Change ?).




-jever, quarter can be refused when those who or it
subsequently ©ttesrpt to destroy those who have granted lfc# *
"iphasis added.)
at distinguishes the Davy's approach to the seenln^ly
inflexible rule set down by the convention as opposed to the
Army's aooroach in "7-1Q, T'he Law of Land Warfare , is f
inclusion of another of the classical exceptions to %
of quarter. i do not mean to iirroly that this us of one
upsmanshiD makes the tf*rjr*§ publication any better than the
Army's, since both manuals sre deficit o ioa« degree
there has been considerable resistance to proposed changes
to the so-called Laws of Warfare hj both services in the past
decade. \s is regrettable since certain principles of war-
fare have become outdated since World War II, and we ©re facing
a new enemy instilled with new concepts and ideologies, such
as are the Viet Cong and Worth Vietnamese Hegulars, and
find ourselves equipped with new and sophisticated weapons
such as oolaris and intercontinental missiles and the potential
of interplanetary missiles. ~e and needs change,
including the needs of war, both offensive and defensive.
The Hague Convention® are more than a half century old. Geneva





l»b bn#* ©v abftftn *
is almost twenty years behind us, we encounter today a new
and dsn^erouf; enemy, who neither wears fi uniform, nor respects
any of the customs that do not suit his convenience . srt
and parcel with his "military" tactics go the weapons of terror
and fear, which include the killlag of hapless vl chiefs
and the bombing of crowded theatres and restaurants filled
with civilians.
As discussed later in the area of aerial warfare, there
are antiquated articles of the Hague Regulations which were
never formally revoked, but out of sheer necessity, as the
concents of aviation as a weapon ejrnsnd.ed and. bombardment of
certain areas became essential notwithstanding that civilians
would be killed, those articles became meaningless, tech-
nically, many thousands of airmen on both sides were guilty
of violations of the Hague articles relating to such warfare,
but none was tried as a war criminal for such c:; plaee
occurrences for obvious reasons, what I am suggesting is a
realistic approach to the rules relating to the conduct of
war, which will make such rules flexible enough to be adapted
to the changing times and changing needs.
7^, Art, 25, Hague Regulations, "The attack by bombard-
ment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or
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Generally Lug* Vne modern rule in naval warfare
ti that enemy shirking which is engaged in the war effort,
whether it be merchant or warshin, may be sunk on sight,
but once the att ftf assault is over and no further vio-
lence is necessary, such as upon a signal to surrender if
not a ru.se, then quarter must ranted, "^he captain of
a German surface raider was tried as a war criminal for his
prolonged attack on a British merchantman after she had in-
7 %dlcated surrender. J After several minutes of heavy fire
from the German raider, the British ship stopped her engines,
acknowledged the attacker's signal not to use her radio m
raised an answering pennant. :. thstanding the German
continued to attack for fifteen minutes sn6 inflicted a
number of casualties on the British crew who was abandoning
the ship. In another charge, where the signal was not one
°f unequivocal surrender , but rather merely an indication
that the ship was sinking and that the captain and crew were
abandoning ship, the court held that continued firing was
permissible and not a war crime. How this reconciles with
Article 23, paragraph (c) of the Maguc ulations I do not














know, si-c^ the s^ lei was obviously hors de combat
at the ' of her so-called equivocal signal.
it cir -ances where an unqualified rule cannot be
applied are not tiful in naval warfare as in the area
of land warfare, hut the classical exceptions cited in the
previous section are as applicable to war at sea es on t
land, "he moral issues are interesting, but as with the foot
soldier, the sailor will find theologians hole as many
opinions about war at sea as k\ o about combat on the
shores.
Most writers categorize tin ic principles of the Law
of War into three concent F--mil it ary necessity, humanity s
chivalry. it the essence of these principles is contained
predominantly in the principle of military necessity,
97
Dr. Francis Lieber states in his classic
Mill tors'" necessity, as understood by
modern civilized nations, consists in
the necessity of those measures which
are indispensable for securing the
ends of war and which are lawful ac-
cording to the modern law and usages
of war . 7 8 { Enohasis adde d „
)
The huraa.nl tari ens, however, ell too often tend to lo
exclusively at the horrors and sufferings of war and in their
77. General Order 100, Instructions for the Government
of Armies of the United States in the Field .






fall • a necessar • iuct I a*
tial to arrive t* ends fo~ ^r is being fou^nt.
inf?. - they def est their own purpose and
ore honored in thoir breach than practice.
ere are justifiable circumstances under which q; at
to be denied M as ~nd, BU s, ruses and
•trategeat :rhore quarter 1 id then resistance oon-
iues, reprisals md retaliations, infra, ill-
*.„„„ laalty *-There no other reason/-
"
mailable,
"Tie United States Nsvy has made a. half-hear- J-o qual-
if7 the rule in its publication ' :.ls
short and leaver Itonal a mere
of < '
In this rep-arc" it is s ~e to note the precise Xan-
of a portion of tha Judgment of the Internetlot " ilitary
Frlbanal, ""urenberg, Oeiman^ (1 I e of Admiral Sari
Doenitz:'
view Of all II I proved and in
particular of an order of the British
alty announcer; on the 8th of
19^0 that all vessels should be sunk
/' submarine s7 In the Skagern
79. NTWIP 10-2.










cj-2 fee. i nterro gator i es
Xeo^_/ 3 ral Chester ;'. kjmitVT
U # S* 1 t unrestr i cted SS ne
warfare was carried on in the Pacific
eceais by the United -g fyim the
first day that nation entered the war
,
the rer tenor of u&initz iTs rot assessed
on the ground of his breaches of the -,
internet i< lew of subsarl'h< !-e,
•ohasis added.)
This roust certainly ran'*? as one of the most significant
anaraolys of the judgments that followed World Hits II. enitz
was charged, inter alia , with waging unrestricted submarine
warfare contrary to iSaval "rctocol end International Law r
Custom, rie was found guilty thereof by the Court, but he in
not sentenced therefor because the SMI "breaches" (i.e. war
crimes) were ordered and committed by the nations which sat
** Judgment on hi m. With this kind of logic, I do not doubt
that former President frttKSfla was relieved in more than one
respect by the fact that the use of the atomic bomb helped
the allies to "win the war for his side."'* I use the .Doenitz
case to illustrate the futility of attempting to set down
set of invariable rales of war. It is ludicrous to condemn
Admiral Doenitz for applying the principle of military neces-
sity to the waging of unrestricted submarine warfare, while
at the same time accepting it as a hard fact of life from our
Si* M. at 169.
mm st
ach • . i hfi af
iral x , E ! 3 to l-noyr
and this .-..,, | j f ^ n<3 nothlng
ang wifcta ;« unrestricted - r-
fr-re from Onit« '-ten en'- hr
II, and It Is i ttilty of the same
hold it ti> he ' his ?o~
called guilt by awarding no 3 as to thin *oi
Aid It too , ffl fl? Itself 1





ie*pt of aviation as a weapon Is quite sophisti-
cated today In spite of its brief existence. Since aircraft
is not much Ml at sixty years old, it is air/ m it
has developed Into a sleek, complex machine that can be as
deadly as it is beautiful. Qne of the most brilliant, and
certainly the most noted, authorities on Wl m relati
to aircraft, J. H« Spaight, LL.u. f :-rrote as lonp ?14
when aviation was barely out of its infancy, a fine summery
and prognostics ti on of aviation M i wesoon to the effect:
The fighting aircraft has, beyond all
question, arrived, and come to fit. The
extraordinary development of the power-
orooelled aeroplane. . .within the last
few years, has removed the question of
aerial war from the subordinate place. . .
and has given it e prominence and im-
portance which demand for it speci
-.sideration and Independence as a do-
main of war law. ... /fjhe science of
war and the science of f! have in our days
formed an alliance which will. . . endure
as long as war itself. . . . All the ques-
tions connected with the use of aircraft in
war are new and constantly chan: with
the progress of flight. The variation in
the efficiency of flying craft and their
capabilities necessarily affects the final-
ity of any rules which proposed for
application to them. • • . To question the
legitimacy of the use of aircraft in war is
60





** sa grroX 8«
simply to plough the sand. The jurists who
demanded total prohibition of the new an
. . • were treading: on the futile oa^
as the„?ope who issued the bull against the
comet.-" 2
S recount the fascinating history and development of
the airplane ss a weapon would be lengthy and regrettably
would lipase an inappropriate burden to this thesis. Con-
sequently, the glories and frustrations, the thrills end
anguish of combat and death in and from the skies must of
necessity be left to another time. It is enough to note that
the airplane, the rocket and the missile are here to stay.
Aerial warfare is a hard fact and as 1 ifl men war against
each other, they will do so from the air. What was little
more than a Buck Rogers fantasy a scant twenty-five years
ago is reality today. The issue then is ffltf whether aerl f
warfare, as a whole, is lawful, but under what drownstances
can, and. must, It be limited in its application. The tot
answer to this covers a broad spectrum of air war and the law
and is beyond the scope of this thesis, I, therefore, limit
the consideration to the principles of aerial warfare as they
relate to a practical application of the concept of quarter.
The second world war witnessed a marked deterioration
in the standard of jrood manners e.nd chivalry in the air that





had been set in World baaii of this comity and
chivalry was in custom and r , and not in the law itself.
When aircraft were first employed as weapons, there was a
reawakening of the old ''nightly chivalry that pervaded
i-urooe hundreds of years afro, aerlaan pilot wrote In
world Har I:
It is natural that the chivalric soirit
ould be strong, Kven the Boche,
treacherous and brutal in all other
fighting, has felt its influence, and
battles in the air with sportsmanship
and fairness. . . , There is mutual
resnect and exchange of civilities much
as there was between oooos^. 3.^3
The many interesting accounts of these chlvalristic
attitudes are contained in other excellent works of J,
Spaight. It is regrettable that the snirit of honor that
prevailed in the early development of aircraft as a weapon
did not carry over to modern times, but as the time ed,
so did the attitudes. Out of sheer military necessity, the
employment of the airplane as a destructive force broadened
and the attempts to regulate its use, such rtiele 25»
Hague Regulations of "Warfare of 1907 as mentioned above, °*
33. Lieut. B. A. Melt«r, 'nights of the Air, p. 21 (1918).
t« Air Power Bnd I (3 editions, I9t*, 1933,
19^-?). Ml of Spaight* s works are brilliant and comprehensive,
and are highly recommended to anyone interested in the science
of flight and the laws of war. The'/ virtually cover every
asoect of this fascinating field to date.
85. See note 7k, supra .
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t. only fell into oblivion, but were shown to be so patently
misguided that no question of their application as the basis
of a war crime was ever raised in World War II. >s today
we find that in modern war, chivalry has ceased to count in
the air as well as on land and sea. War today ic rim and
serious business. ere is no room for courtesy and evf
though the humanitarian hss attempted to mitigate end amelio-
rate the horrors of war, such considerations came from sources
other than the attitudes of knightly chivalry. Air fighting
has now become a general thins:. ombs, rockets, I . ssiles
are often fired upon targets seen only on radar screens hi
above cloud cover. Personal encounters between aircraft are
becoming more and more rare. The day of the old fashioned
dogfight is gone. Jets and air-to-air missiles are impersonal
and unerringly accurate. The side winder missile is a bril-
liant wesson, but because of it the fssious Immelmann maneuver
used so often to evade another attacking aircraft may be a
thing of the past.
From all of this came a new attitude about the concept
of quarter. The circumstances of the aircraft in extremis
were new and no customary law of the air was available to
answer the problems. Certainly it would be chivalrous not to
continue to attack a disabled machine, but while it is true
that the so-celled laws of war forbid the killing of an enemy
63
JTTJI SAW
who has no 1< . the "means of defenc*-, prohibition
Is coupled With the Important r ftaation that the erx r
has "surrendered at discretion."* There is no obligation
to cease firing upon an enemy airman whose machine has been
disabled, nor does I" a a whole lot of sense to allow hla
to escape and live to tight another day. Certainly if he is
over your lines an? capture If nent upon his landing or
crash, it Bight be argued that he should be allowed, to live.
;>ut the variables here are obvious and the question is too
close to justify any disregard of nillti -cescity. Cessa-
tion of the attack is unnecessary and there is no obi on
to cease fire and grant ouarter. is is another obvious ex-
cent ion to t rd rule and, although not an analen
'
certainly is classical amonc; aerial warfere.
The interesting asoect of the relationship between aerial
warfare an tartar is that :ue Conventions were written
before the airplane was developed, as a weapon. us the atti-
tudes expressed in those conventions relating; to the law and
customs of war were more concerned with land and naval warfare
and at best the aspect of bombardment froa lighter than air





balloons. Vcvr con side
op
far as bardasnt wan concerned' ;itarian
aspects of quarter were generated fro se limited ex-
periences on land and m •> ithout too much consideration
beii 7en to the awesome weapon fehi n fill -1
Las. It is farther worthy of note that the Go Conven-
tions contain no mention of qualifying or enhancing these
laws codified in the earlier conventions. Also subsequt
90 91
Declarations ' and Conventions "; Commissi-. are worthy
of note as efforts made by the civilised nations to develoo
rules of aerial conduct, but none | been formally adopts
and do not control today either as customary or codified
International Law. i fact that the** resoluti i iave not
become International Law does '.aan, however, that there
are no governing principles
i
respect to aerial warfare.
An examination of the practical aspects is better suited to
the development of this thesis, since aviators are not as




91. Commission of Jurists meeting at the Hague (19?'')
aDDOinted by resolution dated February 4, 1922, shing-
ton Conference on the Limitation of /-rmaments to study, inter




.^ered by the so-called laws as are the soldier and
sailor, and it is easier to understand and accept the fact
that in aviation it is rarely possible to give quarter. As
a famous I reneh ace of World War I said in his accounts of
;bat aviation of that war/ 1" In aviation there is sore
often no alternative but victory or death, and it is rarely
possible to give quarter without betraying the interests of
93
one's country.' '
What occurs is a life or death struggle in the air and
the enemy airman cannot surrender molding up his hands
e a soldier on the ground can. Clearly disabled aircraft
may still be in a position to fight and often do.
(B SI ill pilot was killed by another French ace, ..--lynener,
and as the .-'renchaan followed the falling aircraft to confirm
the kill, he found himself in the midst of a hail of bullets
being fired from the plane by fehf uuq observer who was
still alive in the two seater aircraft. Guyneraer says:
I must admit that it MM fine act for
the observer, I-mowi at he would soon
92. Foiick, «es Combats (1^20 ).
93. Id. at 133.
9^. Consider the many cases of Japanese ..ami: aze planes
in world War II, and the deliberate crashing and ramming of








crashed on the ground, to try to tr
fee f who se
-
him there ,?5
rest German ace von -icbthofen described In Per Mote
llKpffieaer' how he soared an bngllsh airman whose olane
was on fire. Si followed him down and landed ne an.
After they had landed, the Englishman told 91 ichthofe.n
bow he had tried to fire on him during the descent but th
his machine ffttR had jammed. bichthofen complains, ave
him quarter; he profits by it and rewards me afterwards by
97
a treacherous shot." iy such cases give evidence to
the difficulty of sparing a disabled aircraft in the air .
The attacker cannot be bound by any rules of war to cease
firing uoon the machine. "Hie whole puroose is to destroy
it and the pilot so as to achieve the end of the combat.
I the humanitarian this may seem ruthless, but it would be
illogical to oretend that it would be in keeping with the
objectives of war to cut short the attack simply because
you had your adversary at a disadvantage. It is possible
for a disabled aircraft to lend without further damage to
95. "'ortane, Guynemer, 'vhe /bee of Aces, 117-119 (1913)
96. an. 103-9 (1920).
97. Id. ftt 109.
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to kh< "er by falling to finish off io\ir adversary who
Is not li | on to surrrnr-- is diFcre'ioi? nor to
be taken prisoner?
While surrender in the air is virtually impossible, :
there is no need to break off the a1 w ed air-
craft, there is the possibility of ^render of rround
forcer to ettac ' aircraft by lieplaying
of surrender white f
"
!
If „ '>ensior< of attr'
is so:newhe*- irnrrctical, however, since it is ur
possible for the attacking flyers to tebe end hold the ground
troops prisoners. i initial difficulty lies in t ct
that today*! aircraft rROvinc equal to find, often twice the
soeed of sound are rot in position to reco<-ni?e the white
flar or other indications of surrender, but the probler. that
arises with surrender of around troops to attacking aircraft
rroes beyond the inability of the flyer to recormi^e the
signals. Often there ere no rrovnd forces at hand to %•-
control over the potential prisoners, - re is always
oresent the oossibility and orobability that the "surrender"
is no .r.ore a ruse to "enable the enemy trooos to esc?
efter the immediate danger is oast."
98. Speight, Air Power and War Rights (3d ed) 132 (19^ 7 )
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MUTf to be no reason why such indication of
-render may not be disregarded and the attack continued.
I admit this rs to fly in the face - I e roscriptions
of j>rtl ? of the Bftgtt* Regulations, but quite obviously
this can be and is justified under the rule of military
necessity and is an exception to the conventional rule. is
is not to t&ylfeat surrender of ground forces, fg I forces
for that matter, to attaching aircraft is not m B->
ible. Examples fro?o i-v'orld War II can be seen of the capture
of an entire fortress'-' and a submarine " upon surrender
to the olanes and ultimate capture by close by friendly forces
and vessels. ese are exceptional cases, however, and it
appears that the logical end better mile is that which allows
the attach to be continued out of necessity rather than to
break off and allow the enemy to escane when no RSSli
fttt&d forces or vessels are at hand.
The logic which allows the continuation of the attar
on disabled aircraft carries over I Itimize such at
99 • General H. 3« Arnold reported to the Secretary for
War in 19^3 that "the garrison of the Spadillo airport (at
Pantell aria)
,
placed a white flag on the ground. • . /and/
for the first time in history a fortified oosition of ""great
strength surrendered directly to an air force.'*
100. Gordon, I Seek Ky Prey in the Waters, 165-7 (19^3)
•
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on an opponent and his aircraft landed behind, his own lla«
or in other grounds friendly to him, t« fact that the
crashed airman "'holds up or waves his hands Is immaterial;
101the attacker is justified under the laws in killing him.
'
The matter is not as clear cut when the aircraft Is forced
down in the attacker's territory and the enemy airmen do not
continue to resist or try to escape. Under such circus as
there would have to be justification on the part of the at-
tacker to kill his foe who is now hors de combat and in no
position to escape . fact that the airmen were downed is
not the controlling circumstance. It is the fact ey
were doited et a time and place in which they are certain to
he captured that makes the difference. Only under these ex-
ceptional circumstances would it he criminal to kill them.
Thus, the usual rule should be permissive and only the "ex-
ception" prescriptive, rather than the converse, a natural
sequitur of all of this is$he obvious conclusion that an air-
man may still be attached at any time that he continues to
resist, however, ineffectively, and notwithstanding that his
aircraft has crashed or is otherwise disabled. Resistance of
any form calculated to avoid capture, to effect escape or
otherwise deny the attacker his ultimate objective, constitutes
101. SI "", on. c|_t. n. 98 at p. 135.
?0
' »i1 art.* *1 .#:•
-
a waiver of any right to quarter. ie downed airmen is no
different than any soldier on land and he can expect to be
treated the same in the event of resistance. In October
1966, the following quote appeared in an article in the
!vew York Times, dateline Thonaonbam, South Vietnam:
It was an unusual day as Foxtrot Company
of the Second Battalion, Fifth Marine
Regiment, oat rolled in strength along the
southern boundary of the demilitarized
zone which divides North and South Vietnam.
The leading element of the Third Platoon
caotured one enemy prisoner but they killed
him when he violently resisted capture by
nearly biting off a Marine's thumb and
sinking his teeth into the beck of another
Marine's hand. 10
2
The action of the United States Marines in this case speaks
for Itself, and the same consequences can be expected by
any member of the enemy forces who offers such resistance,
whether he be an infantryman, sailor or airman , he si stance
need not consist of trying to escape or trying to kill one's
would be captors. It can consist of simply trying to burn
a downed aircraft or an immobilized tank or artillery piece,
or in trying to scuttle one's ship. The example of the
downed airman attempting to burn, his machine after a crash









is wmBt Illustrative, billing hia after he has come down
in enemy ground Is justified under the circumstances, and
he is considered as continuing to resist as long as he tries
to avoid not only his nersonal capture, but the talcing of
his machine. Although this may appear to conflict with the
duty of the orashed airmen to destroy his airplane under
such circumstances, It is justified as an eoua.1 duty on the
part of the enemy airmen or other military personnel to pre-
vent him from destroying it, and to kill him if necessary to
so prevent him.
From all of these examples, it can be seen that the
application of fundamental principles of law to aerial war-
fare is difficult at best because of the enlargement of the
scope of and the changes in the character of modern war. It
is noted in this regard that rapid advances in modern war
have a tendency to obliterate the old distinctions such as
between combatants and non-combatants (herein consider the
atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The second
world war saw a significant departure from old customs and
prohibitions relating to aerial bombardment, which were
figuratively blasted into oblivion by both sides. Prom
tactical bombing came strategic bombing and then on to
target-area bombing, i.e., "destroying large areas contain-
ing, but not confined to, centres of production of munitions,
72
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of other art! of vi*-,ei importance for the oonduot of war
103
such as on, end of centres of communication* ad
finally th« tT-1 rockets and atom bombs.
Lauterpacht suggests In his Seventh Edition of Oppen-
heim's International Law that:
It is a moot point whether the genera
recourse to strategic target-bombing had
the result of endowing- It with a measure
of legality and of abolishing—or showing
obsolescence of— the principles underlying
the /proposed/ Hague rules of 1923 Zre*
ba« to the limitation of the aircraft
an agency of warfare/. 10*J-
It is suggested by that authority that the fact that no con-
viction was recorded on any charges before the International
Military Tribunal at vuremberg in this regard Mneed not neces-
sarily be interpreted as Indicating that in view of the tri-
bunal such bombing was not illegal, but is merely compatible
with the explanation that since both sides pursued this
105
method of warfare, neither was going to be held responsible,*
To this I can only say nonsense. According to that reasoning
although two wrongs still don't make a right, if each side
does it, then, wrong or not, it is a good defense. This is
103* House of Lords Debates , vol. 130, col. 753.













as asinine as the refusal of the tribunal to sentence :. ral
for the so-called war crime of waging unrestricted
submarine warfare, even though found guilty thereof, simply
because the United Stav. id British had done the st
tiling, .: obvious answer is that not only was the strategic
target-bobbing not illegal, but it was totally justified pur-
suant to military necessity. ; oncer President "Truman is no
more a war criminal than is any other commander who orders
the employment of new techniques, weapons and concepts in
modern warfare, so as to attain the m&xtmtHB result at the
least cost in men ^rA material. The humanitarians who
think they can outlaw war by voting against it take the
wrong turn in the road to world peace in this regard, While
it may be true that their hopes may be realized when men
realistically accept their aims, it won't be through their
methods. A rational approach to the end of war is through
an acceptance of the changing concepts, and an intelligent
appraisal of the futility of war as an instrument of policy.
When we adjust our international thinking in line with the
awesomeness of modem nuclear war, we will discover that
outdated rules and the vengeance of the "victors" sitting
in judgment on the losers have not deterred one bullet or
one bomb. Nuremberg may serve as a deterrent against no-
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• 3 restriction : a ly af' a state or group of
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restrictions affecting the ' ill of belligerents were limited
to practices of eoup.l convenience to bot end at that
-,- were worded so poorly M to find re honored
?ch than In observance „ J\mti ~~ ~ MCPf—
long: &s n.en in their weaknesses Mill not live in -peace.
,T,he legal principles of land and naval warfare «re antiquated
in part in themselves, and it is obvious that the application
of their to the rspidly changinr face of cor.bat in pnd, fi
the air, nnd perhaos outer space, would be difficult, if not
ludicrous.
The Nsvy's publication govemlnr the Law of Ravel War*
106fere points up the futility of any attempt in this regerd.
oh ?50 begins with the pronouncement:
There is no comprehensive body of laws
specifically applicable to air warfare
the sane sense that there is a com-
prehensive body of specialized laws
relating- to sea warfare and a similar
body relating only to land warfare. 107
106. 10-2.







Ql > to* -:' '
As ta S3 of the status of things to
.
.
, It wo--". ; son-
le. r 3i h.e par." said!
I . i , . :Yer, ayy ar
conventional rules of a general character
act of mr on I,
at sea which must be considered equally
binding in p\t warfare* in adMLltia&j
there are certain specialized laws of
nrfare i
sidercd applicable to air warfare as well*
is book applies to the whole of naval
ereby inel ,.r
warfare. Appropriate note is taken
throughout this boo/ of fcha sit-
in which the specialized rules of naval
varfara do m illarly re.
conduct of naval air warfare. In the
absence of ;e distinctions, ooer
tional naval liiniiiiniiiiiilnin are to assume
that the rules rt rarfare i
sea are equally applicable to naval air
warfare."^ <
Tils additional language is not only dogmatic, but
iorally YJithout foundation. Only one footnote to th,
cagraph attempts to explain ircumstances under which
the land and sea rules are allegedly applicable to naval
air, but it falls far short of a justification for the un-
precedented and non judicious use of language. It is obvious





rarely be £o??llcable to aerial war and any such application
would be by exception rather than standard practice. The
opragraph is misleading at best and if taken literally is
dangerous. It appears after all this that the author had
second thoughts about his generalizations and attempted to
mitigate some of the dogmatism in another footnote to the
paragraph wherein he says*
Caution must be exercised in indiscrim-
inately attempting to apply 'by analo*
these specialized rules of land warfare
/sic_7 to air warfare. nhe peculiar con-
ditions of aerial warfare have occasional
practices unique to this form of warfare.
Consequently, the attempt to apply 'by
analogy' the £peclalized rules of land and
sea warfare /^sXc/ to air warfare may lead
frequently to a disregard of these practices
and, to this extent, be quite misleading.
For example, the distinctions made between
legitimate ruses and forbidden perfidy are
different in land and naval warfare. Yet
neither the distinctions made in land war-
fare nor the distinctions made in naval
warfare have been in accordance with the
practices of air warfare. 1^
Although well intentioned, it is apparent that the Navy's pub-
lication lends nothing to a genuine codification of the lews
of aerial warfare, and the attempt to orovlde for certain
rules by analogy is misleading to the airman and fraught with
danger. What is actually needed is a complete re-examination











of all of the customary principles and then a codification
which is not simply general restatement of the law but a
new and realistic oronouncement of flexible rules, adaptable
to modem conventional and atomic warfare.
i&cyr
prisals are acts of retaliation in the form of con-
duct which would otherwise be unlawful, resorted to by
belligerent against enemy personnel or property for acts
of warfare committed by the other belligerent in violation
of the laws of war, for the purpose of enforcing future
110
compliance with the recognised rules of civilised warfare.
Thus, by definition, "reprisals'* in war are the commission
of acts which, although Illegal in themselves, may, under
the specific circumstances of a given case, become justified
because the guilty adversary has himself behaved illegally*
The action may be taken a® a last resort , in order to pre-
vent the adversary from acting illegally In the future.
The first determination, therefore, is that the enemy has
behaved in an illegal manner, and the next is that all other
reasonable means of securing your enemy's compliance with
the laws of war must be exhausted before resort may be had
to reprisals. In this sense, reprisals do not have to be
undertaken against the precise law breakers, but there must
be some close connection between the victims of the reprisals
and those persons who acted Illegally in the first Instance














their acts £6 tti to constitute a joint responsibility
•
As a result reprisals are never supposed to be adopted for
revenue and are designed solely to induce the adversary to
refrain from illegal practices. i actual form of the
reprisal need not conform to those illegal acts committed
by the enemy, hut it should ^jot be excessive lis the decree
of violence.
Positive rules of Isw on reprisals are extremely rare
in municipal law and completely absent in modern internatio;
law. Article I, Section 8, paragraph 11, of the United States
Constitution contains a rather obsolete rule of lav; on re-
prisals to the effect that Congress may declare war, and also
"grant letters of marque and reprisals. But in the sense
that reprisals are employed in modem warfare, the ancient
language in our Constitution, "grant letters of. . , re-
isals," is without function today. Thus, since we do not
find a codification of the rules relating to reprisals, we
must look to the customary law for interpretations.
The initial consideration then is that "reprisals"
(both short of war, viz nacific bloc ade, and those in war)
are lawful, if and when conducted under apnrooriate con-
trolled circumstances and conditions. The preolse form that
we are interested in is "denial of quarter" as an act of









of an otherwise illegal act to prevent e •' versarv fro
* illegal conduct and to enforce tils Compliance
with the laws of civilized warfare, we can see that Article
23 o? the Hague • Nations of Warfare does not provide for
reprisals as en exception to the rule of quarter, vet
reprisals are legally acceptable concepts and are a survival
of the jus talionls - i.e., an eye for an eye, a limb for a
limb, a life for a life. If the enemy resorts to illegal
conduct, such as a denial of quarter, then a denial thereof
in return is permitted by way of reprisal.
It is said that reprisals are the saddest necessity of
war, but the comment speaks for itself. ~lsals are per-
mitted by the law of war (jus in bello) and arise out of
strict necessity. They equalize the position of the victim
of an illegal act with that of the ag-prressor. There have
been abuses of the right of reprisal In recent wars, but
these abuses generally lay in the area of failure to observe
certain criteria laid down for their employment, to wit?
(a) no other sanction or means of inducing a
return to lawful behavior is available;
(b) the reprisal is proportionate to the ante-
cedent illegal act;
(c) the reprisal is made on proper authority.
111. See McDoug-al and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
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Bi6 law is not clear ft ret a ie use
of -mid be px n retaliation. re
are certain restrictions such as reprisals ftgatnst prisoners
112 113
of war, or upon no; v-combatant a or t of hos-
11^
:es,
*~ but there is no restriction per se as to denial
of quarter as a form of reprisal for a denial of quarter,
The criteria mentioned above are those generally commented.
uoon by leading authorities in International Law, but I
hasten to add there is no universal agreement on the condi-
tions that must be met in order to invoke the doctrine.
This point was clearly illustrated in a discussion carried
on before the International Military rribun?!
between the U. S. Chief Prosecutor, Justice Jackson, and
Professor Dr. Franz Szner, one of the German defense counsels.
In reply to some rather sweeping generalizations made hy
Justice Jackson as to the doctrine of reprisals, Dr. Emer
commented:
^r ten years I have lectured on Interna-
tional Law at the university Slid I believe
I understand a little about it. Reprisals
112. G?W f art. 13; GC t art. 33.
113. G?W, art. 87; GC, art. 33.
U*« GG, art. 3^.
82
;
ar lisputed s of
lnte- mal law. One can say that
only on one point there Ls i i ate
certainty, namely that point, which
1 onod first--
mires of reprisals against prls-
\eT8 of way are prohibited.* .: /ery-
thing else is natter of dispute and
all valid ftl
Law, It is not correct that it is
floral practice in all states,
and therefore valid international
law, that a protest is a prerequisite
for taking reprisals. Neither is it
correct that there has to be a so-
called, reasonable connection, ti
asserted that there must be a re"
tion as regards time, and above all
a proportionality be send-
ing and the actually committed vio"
tion of International Law. Thi re-
scholars of International Law who
assert, and it is indeed so, ;;'.., it
would be desirable that there be
proportionality In every c . Bat
in existing International Law, In the
sense I 0OM agreement has been
made to that effect or that It has
international legal usage,
this is not the case. It will have
to be said therefore, on the basis
of violations of International Law
by the other side, that we under no
circumstances sake a war of repris?
'.dnst prisoners of war; every other




otwiths tending that the question is not easy to
resolve and international scholars differ as to the criteria




M " «8 ©Oft-"
venti;- lojed as a
Lf denie in
olation of the laws o* -jzt. - i 'Jonventi- re
tpletely silent as to this ".trait considerations
to reprisals against prisoners, and other pe
i-mo have fallen Ir.to the hands of the er well as non-
combatants -aid bos-1-- -cs, [ague ftegttl .tain an
'icle tlv ' llttit I conduct, but I not pro-
scribe it exc ' er ce circumstances. What we
are faced with is fcfc reprisals belong to
small class of ich enable warfare to be
within legr~ ] | ' md they may thus be paid to be a kind
of MotAtlon for the laws of war. l.y the rales con-
cerning reprisals belor part to customary law
and are truly ambiguous as c a seen from, the foregoing
differences of scholarly opinion. The doctrine is frau
with great disadvantages and like any policy it is vulnerable
to abuses. Tht point of this thesis, however, is not to
critically analyze the doctrir: a whole, but rather to
116. -Article 50 of the Hague Regulations states; o
general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be Inflicted
upon the population on account of the acts of Individuals for










] bhe so-called of
*>f reprisals
>wever 1 orne in mind
en consideration is ' - the < :r to the decision
deny quarter ss s of reprisal guilty
La
117
enemy. Sri" testren, V .0., tf the University of Helsinki,





'liferents are often too anxious to
resort to their, ev *lity
of the enemy's notion is far fros clear.
There is laok of objectivity he oo.
If the other party considers that it has
at tranegT I .its of
warfare, still more severe counter-
reprlsr" til title* t continues
til there is little or no restriction
left upon warfare. ring
both v/orld Were, belli bi often rid
themselves of inconvenient rules under
the pretext of reprisal. It hrs often
ber ise of reprisals
be either entirely forbidden
or at least considerably limited. As,
however, measures of reprisal often offer
117. Professor of Interactional and Constitutional Law.







the only effective means of defence against
i disregards the restrictive
of oir prohibition would serve no
useful purpose in spite of these di.! a«
tages. If a decision to resor reprisals
could be submitted in advance to so an-
tral body for appro-: d this body could
also supervise their appl con-
siderable advance would have bee e.
t there is little chance of establish!
a system of this vind. 3.1-9
What it reduces to is the obvious fact t
long way from total peace and an end to all war. Until
that time, men will continue to make war and in this context
it is apparent that "until a comprehensive, centralis nd
effective sanctions process is achieved in the world arena,
belligerents have to police one another and enforce the laws
of war against each other. '" free* legal measures of
reprisal may justifiably and quite logically consist of
denial of quarter. I seriously question If a sore effective
means can be employed to enforce a reasonable rule of quarter
on the part of one's adversary than to deny any « to
him in the event of his misconduct la this regard. It was
a barbaric notion that was contained in the old phrase "ask
no quarter and give no quarter, M out in actual practice, the
119. Id. at 72.





belligerent who "mows he will receive none, If he gives
none, soon departs from, his dogmatic position, Under such
circumstances (i.e., an unreasonable denial of quarter on
his part), it is legal, soral and quite Obviously logical
to deny quarter to the offender, In return, as t
of reprisal. The conventional and codified laws of w
should be redrafted to so provide and to remove any am-














i of necessity the examination of the principle*
of quarter has been brief, I believe the significance of the
practicalities vis-a-vis the present rules has been demon-
strated, storically the concept of quarter has evolved
into an unrealistic codification of a principle that has not
kept pace with modern warfare. I do not- take issue with the
reasonable efforts of statesmen to ameliorate the horrors
of war, but I cannot sympathize with their failure to
recognize the obvious fact that methods of warfare, as lo
as war remains with us, are an expanding thing and to attempt
to place impossible restrictions thereon creates rather th-
cures problems. Someday our descendants may see an end to
war, but I doubt that our present generation will be among
*se so fortunate, w'hen war is finally gone, then the
rules will no longer be needed. But until that time, if
we are to accomplish what the visionaries dream, it will be
tnrough a realistic approach to war, its methods and its
objectives. ust formulate our rules of conduct accord-
ingly. If the proscriptions are Impossible to follow, choas
rather than regulation results. >s I commented above, if we
are to r>ro?ress in the humanities of war, it will be by defin-
itive rules which take into consideration the realities of
88
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at
combat, and not by couching our hopes in codes containing
such restrictive language that the rules become impossible
to follow. U regulations relating- to land, navel end
aerial warfare, of which none of the latter are definitively
codified as of yet, should be drafted or redrafted in such
a way as to incorporate all of the legitimate exceptions to
the rule of quarter. Fhey should provide for reasonable
contingencies in the expanding concepts of modern warfare
and the atomic *£•< The rule in each area of combat, land,
sea and air, including space, should be clearly enunciated
along with its exceptions. Flexible provisions for expansion
of the concept should be ma.de. In this way, the warrior will
know where he stands and he will have bean extricated from
the horns of the dilemma where he so frequently finds himself
when the rules are often impossible to interpret and follow.
It will be fine when there is no more war, but until then,
speaking as a professional, it would be well to know the
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